The last few days were, perhaps, the best possible argument for the virtues of Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza: they saw the release of the hostages and Palestinian prisoners held by Israel, a ceasefire, and the partial withdrawal of Israeli troops. Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law who helped broker the deal, boasted that “deal guys” like him had succeeded because they were prepared to leave the details for later; Qatari prime minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani similarly said on Friday that “if we went for full-package negotiations, we wouldn’t have reached these results”.
Today, the difficulties of that approach will start to come into focus – and, according to Peter Beaumont, the plan repeats a pattern seen in past attempts to engineer a lasting peace. “This was exactly the failure of the Oslo accords,” he said. “The idea was ‘let’s throw this against the wall and see if anything sticks’ – whole important strands were parked and put further down the road. And the far right started to carve up what was supposed to be the Palestinian state with settlements and roads.”
Here are some of the questions that will have to be answered if the Trump plan is to prove any different.
Will Israel withdraw its troops?
So far, Israel has pulled back from Gaza’s major cities, to a “yellow line” that means it now occupies about 53% of the territory. In theory, withdrawals will follow in two further stages: first, when an international stabilization force is mobilised; second, to a lasting “security buffer zone”.
But Benjamin Netanyahu’s language in recent days had a different emphasis. “The IDF remains deep inside Gaza territory and controls all of its dominating points,” he said in a statement last week. “We are encircling Hamas from all directions.”
Absent real carrots and sticks for Netanyahu, the recent precedents for further withdrawal are not promising. “They have occupied new territory in Syria indefinitely,” Peter said. “They were still hitting southern Lebanon a couple of days ago despite the ceasefire there. If we test the prospect of withdrawal here against how the country has abided by other agreements, what we see is that it is unlikely to happen.”
Will Hamas disarm?
Disarmament is a central tenet of the Trump plan – but on Saturday a senior Hamas official told AFP that disarmament was “out of the question”, adding: “The demand that we hand over our weapons is not up for negotiation”. Even as the hostages were released yesterday, there were images of armed fighters in parts of Gaza, an apparent attempt by Hamas to reassert its authority.
None of that is surprising, Peter said. “Hamas has stayed in power for so long because it has a virtual monopoly on the use of violence. And the history of their rule suggests that when they have arms, they will seek to develop their military infrastructure.”
Even if Hamas agreed in theory, no detail has been provided on how disarmament might happen in practice: would the plan rely on voluntary surrender, or forced inspections? Would the weapons be decommissioned or stored? And what body would assess whether the terms are being adhered to?
One model, cantonment, would see fighters moving to designated disarmament sites where they would surrender their weapons. “But there are obvious questions with that approach too,” Peter said. “They know how they are regarded by the likely players – would they agree to their weapons being placed under Egyptian control? Would they trust an international force? They are self-aware enough to know that once they give their weapons up, they are unlikely to ever see them again.”
How will the ‘international stabilisation force’ operate?
The text of the White House plan says that the US will “work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary international stabiliastion force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza.” It says that such a force will be “the long-term internal security solution”. In theory, it should give Israel the assurance that it can remove its forces without allowing Hamas to rebuild.
While Arab and Muslim states appear to be likely to form the majority of any such force, many crucial details are yet to be worked out: whether it would have a mandate from the UN, what price contributing nations would ask, and exactly what it would be mandated to do. “No one expects that the force would fight Hamas,” a western diplomat told the FT. They argued that the mere presence of the force would make it harder for either side to resume the conflict even if it did “absolutely nothing”.
Peter noted reasons for scepticism about whether the ISF could reliably prevent either side from acting, pointing to a recent grenade attack by an Israeli drone near UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. There might be wider lessons from that deployment, he added. “You would likely have a model similarly mandated to patrol and report on ceasefire violations. But in southern Lebanon, they have been pretty toothless. You would see UN forces on their bases, and then drive to a nearby village controlled by Hezbollah and be asked for your paperwork by a guy on a motorbike.”
Will reconstruction work get under way?
The White House plan promises to “rebuild and energise” Gaza, drawing on “many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas. That vague promise reflects the imperatives pinpointed by Nesrine Malik in this excellent piece:
