Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to the Press

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Are you guys okay if we start early?

QUESTION:  Sure.

QUESTION:  Yeah.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Nah, let’s just wait five minutes.  (Laughter.)  All right.

Well, thank you, guys, for coming today to cover us and to do this event.  I wanted to start – I’m going to be very brief because I just want to get to as many questions as I can.  I can do English.  I’ll answer Spanish if you ask Spanish, and then I’ll answer it in – I’ll answer it in English after I answer it in Spanish.  So any other languages I won’t be able to do it, but those two. 

And then – so look, when I took over as Secretary of State – I’ll refer you back to the hearings we had in the Senate in January about the role I hoped to play.  And I believe very strongly this president was elected – one of the reasons why he was elected, very specific things, but one of the reasons why President Trump was elected is sort of an understanding among the American people that our foreign policy was in need of a complete recalibration.  A recalibration because the world has dramatically changed.  Many of the institutions, policies, assumptions that our foreign policy was operating under were built upon a world that no longer existed, and it required us to re-examine that.

One of the assumptions that I think we had lost during this period of time – and I don’t mean to make this an academic lecture, but I wanted to give you some insight into the broader thinking – as I highlighted at that hearing less than a year – almost a year ago now, is one of the assumptions was the loss of the notion of the national interest in our foreign policy.  At the core, foreign policy needs to be the national interest of the United States.

Now, that doesn’t mean that there aren’t issues and things we care about in the world, but at its core, the core principle of the national interest, the core principle behind our foreign policy needs to be our national interest.  So you have to first of all define what is the national interest, and then you have to apply it.

We defined it as we are in favor of foreign policies that make America safer or stronger or more prosperous – hopefully all three, but at least one of those three.  And then it requires you to prioritize.  Even the richest, most powerful, and influential country on Earth has limited resources, has limited time, and it has to be able to dedicate those resources and time through a process of prioritization.  That includes geographic prioritization, it also includes issue prioritization, and that’s what we intend to do here.

Then you have to have the mechanisms of foreign policy to deliver on it.  In essence, you have to have a Department of State and a National Security Council and all the elements of U.S. foreign policy influence and power to deliver, to identify and then deliver on those priorities.  And that’s what we’ve attempted to do here, and I think we’re well on our way to doing it.  There’s more work to be done.  There’s things we will improve upon.  But generally speaking, it was the genesis behind the reorganization of the department, oftentimes applying reforms that secretaries of states of both parties, appointed by presidents of both parties, have long sought to do. 

And we’re very proud of that going into effect and continuing to work forward.  I think we generally avoided massive disruptions to our operation, although any transition involves some disruption.  But we’re very happy with the way we empowered our regional bureaus, meaning our embassies and the folks at the desks here behind the regions have become more empowered and having influence over every element of our foreign policy, particularly how it’s applied tactically. 

At the same time, one of the things we looked at is foreign aid.  Foreign aid is not a separate activity of the United States Government.  It is an element and a tool of our foreign policy, and it should be used for the purpose of furthering the national interest.  That doesn’t mean we don’t care about human rights.  That doesn’t mean we don’t care about starvation.  That doesn’t mean we don’t care about hunger.  That doesn’t mean we don’t care about humanitarian need. 

What it does mean, however, is that even foreign aid – which is not charity; it is an act of the U.S. taxpayer.  American charities are free to give their money to whoever they want as long as it’s not a sanctioned entity.  But the United States and the taxpayer money should be spent in furtherance of our foreign policy, should be spent in places and on things that further our foreign policy, and even that is not unlimited.  We have a limited amount of money that we can dedicate to foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, and that has to be applied in a way that furthers our national interest, and that’s what we have sought to do as well.

And in that endeavor as well we have empowered the regional bureaus and our embassies to play a dramatic role.  In fact, they are not just the implementers of this; they in many cases are the ones that are suggesting and are leading the response.  And so bringing the tools of foreign aid underneath the umbrella of our broader foreign policy has been an important and dramatic reform.

Even in the midst of all that, we remain engaged around the world, including in conflicts that perhaps are not central to everyday life in America.  But the President has made it a priority to be a peacemaker, and so you’ve seen us engaged whether it’s Russia-Ukraine, or India and Pakistan, or Thailand and Cambodia, which is an ongoing challenge, or the tragedy we see now in Sudan, or the potential for further strife in South Sudan and that falling apart – I mean, or Armenia and Azerbaijan.  We are always looking for opportunities, if possible, to play the role of a mediator that brings about the avoidance of war or the ending of conflicts.  And obviously, in many of these cases you can get people to the table and agree, and then there’s the implementation process. 

And so we’ve made progress on many of these, particularly in getting them to agree to certain conditions.  Obviously it’s ongoing work to make sure that those are implemented and applied.  And some of these conflicts have deep roots that go back many, many years.  But we are prepared to be engaged and helpful in ways that perhaps other nations can’t.  We’ve been viewed as indispensable in that regard, and it’s a role the President takes great pride in, in the promotion of peace around the world, and something he deserves a lot of credit for.  He is personally engaged in all of this.

Obviously the big one was the situation with Gaza which, again, is ongoing.  There is now a ceasefire.  There is not – war is no longer going on at the scale and scope and all the other things that were going on before.  But obviously, there’s more work to remain.  We are still through the process of trying to implement phase one and lead to phase two and phase three.  That is a long-term project, some of which will extend beyond the four years of this administration.  But I thought it was a very important achievement as well.

So we have a lot to be proud about.  I know you probably have some specific questions, and we can get to those, but I wanted to let that – lay that out as the preface and predicate for everything we’re going to do today. 

So I’m going to start – how do I start?  I’m going to start from the back row forward, and then I’ll just juggle in between.  I’ll be here pretty long, so we’ll get to everybody.  Don’t get desperate, don’t get wild.  (Laughter.)  All right, I’ll start with this gentleman with the white hair in the back.  Yes, sir.

QUESTION:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  I want to ask you about Gaza.  U.S. wants Pakistan troops to be in Gaza.  Has – has U.S. got the consent from Pakistan that they will be sending their troops in Gaza for peacebuilding and peacemaking there?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah.  Well, look, in fairness to all the countries we’ve talked to about being and having a presence on the ground, I think they want to know specifically what the mandate, what the specific mandate and what the funding mechanism looks like.  So we’re very grateful to Pakistan for their offer to be a part of it, or at least their offer to consider being a part of it.  I think we owe them a few more answers before we can ask anybody to firmly commit. 

But I feel very confident that we have a number of nation-states acceptable to all sides in this who are willing to step forward and be a part of that stabilization force, and certainly Pakistan is key if they agree to do so.  But I think we owe them a few more answers before we get there.  We’re trying to make a lot of progress here with the – I think the next step here is announcing the Board of Peace, announcing the Palestinian technocratic group that will help provide daily governance.  And then once that’s in place, I think that will allow us to firm up the stabilization force, including how it’s going to be paid for, what the rules of engagement are, what their role will be in demilitarization and so forth.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Next to you, in the back.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for doing this.  I want to start with Russia-Ukraine.  You mentioned that —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Easy stuff, yeah.

QUESTION:  You mentioned your efforts.  There are talks going on right now, starting today and this weekend in Miami.  What are your expectations on those talks?  And the President yesterday made it clear he expects Ukraine to basically step up before Russia walks away.  If you wake up in Odessa, if you’re Ukrainian, this morning we’re seeing Russians are bombing your city.  Or if you turn on the TV and listen to Putin, what he says, why would Ukrainians ignore what the Russians are saying publicly and believing in what they are hearing from media?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah.  Look, there’s a reason why this war hasn’t ended, and that is because there’s complex factors at play.  I know that sounds like a throwaway line, but it’s true.  What we have tried to do in this entire process – and let’s be clear about this.  I mean, the United States is engaged in this.  The President said this – and I’ll translate what I think he’s trying to say to you in all of this, and I think he’s been pretty clear about – is it’s not our war.  It’s a war in another continent.  We have equities, we have engagement in this war, but it’s not our war per se. 

But we have been told by everybody – I think everybody would agree – that there’s only one nation on Earth, there’s only one entity on Earth, that can actually talk to both sides and figure out whether there’s a way to end this war peacefully, and that’s the United States.  And we’ve invested a lot of time, a lot of energy at the highest levels of our government.  I believe President Trump has had more meetings with foreign leaders and others on the war in Ukraine than on any other subject, including trade.  He’s invested a lot of time.  Steve and Jared have invested time.  I have invested time.  The Vice President, the Secretary of War, others, the Secretary of Treasury, and more have invested a tremendous amount of time and energy in this. 

And what we’re trying to figure out here is:  What can Ukraine live with and what can Russia live with?  Sort of identify what both sides’ positions are and see if we can sort of drive them towards each other to some agreement.  Wars end generally in one of two ways: surrender by one side for another, or a negotiated settlement.  We don’t see surrender anytime in the near future by either side, and so only a negotiated settlement gives us the opportunity to end this war. 

A negotiated settlement requires two things: both sides to get something out of it, and both sides to give something.  And we’re trying to figure out what can Russia give, and what do they expect to get; what can Ukraine give and what can Ukraine expect to get.  In the end, the decision will be up to Ukraine and up to Russia.  It will not be up to the United States.

So that’s the role we are trying to play in this, and that’s why you see so many meetings going on.  This is not about imposing a deal on anybody.  It is about determining what both sides expect and need to have, and what both sides are prepared to give in return for it, and figuring out whether we can have those two overlap.  And of course, that takes a lot of time and a lot of hard work.  It can’t generally be done in the media or in press conferences.  I think we’ve made progress, but we have a ways to go, and obviously the hardest issues are always the last issues. 

Yes.  All right, I’m going to go to the next row.  That gentleman right there with the glasses.

QUESTION:  Me?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, right behind you, because you’re not the next row.  That’s the next row right there.  (Laughter.)  Yes.

QUESTION:  Thank you.  I’d like to ask how you view —  

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Oh, I’m sorry.  I didn’t – okay, well, go ahead.  You can start.  I hadn’t seen you.  I’d seen him.  But you can go because you’re first on that row so —   

QUESTION:  Okay.  Great.  Thank you so much.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  As a well-oiled machine, ladies and gentlemen.  So – go ahead.  I’m sorry, ma’am.

QUESTION:  (Laughter.)  Thanks.  I’d like to ask how you view recent escalation of tensions between Japan and China.  You’ve been known for your tough rhetoric towards China over the years.  Do you condemn – excuse me – China’s recent provocative actions against Japan? 

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, no, I think I’ve been nice to China – (laughter) – in terms of the work we have to do with them and – I mean, I had another job.  My job now is to – I represent the President of the United States and the United States in foreign diplomacy, and I think we’ve made good progress with the Chinese.  The Japanese are a very close ally of the United States.  I think these tensions are pre-existing.  We understand that’s one of the dynamics that has to be balanced in that region.  And I believe that we feel very strongly that we can continue with our strong, firm partnership and alliance with Japan and do so in a way that continues to allow us to find productive ways to work together with Chinese – the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government. 

Look, there’ll be tensions.  There’s no doubt about it.  I mean, at the end of the day, China is going to be – is and it will continue to be a rich and powerful country and a factor in geopolitics.  We have to have relations with them.  We have to deal with them.  We have to find the things we are able to work together on.  And I think both sides are mature enough to recognize that there will be points of tension now and for the foreseeable future.  Our job as we’re part – as part of responsible statecraft is to find opportunities to work together.  Because I think if there’s a global challenge that China and the U.S. can work together on, I mean, it’s – I think we can solve it.  And there’ll be points of tension.  We all recognize that.  And our job is to balance these two things.  I think both sides understand that. 

But in the – and I think we can do that without imperiling or in any way undermining our very firm commitment to our partners in the Indo-Pacific that includes not just Japan but South Korea.  And obviously if you extend further out – I don’t want to leave anybody out – but India and Australia and New Zealand and all the other countries.  And we also have growing and burgeoning relationships with countries like Vietnam and even Cambodia that we really haven’t had very close contacts with historically.  But we’ve talked to them a lot lately, obviously, through the context of the conflict going on with Thailand, but also to figure opportunities to work together strategically.  And I say Thailand – of course, we’ve had a very long and strong strategic alliance with them for many years. 

All right.  Now, your – yes, sir. 

QUESTION:  Thank you.  (Via Translation.)  Two specific issues in Spanish. Based on this hemispheric logic, have you considered extending pressure beyond Venezuela or Colombia to regimes like Nicaragua or Cuba? And second, this week the Congress denounced that Mexico is sending dozens of oil tankers to Cuba, and the accompanying concern that this helps finance the dictatorship. Should Mexico reconsider this assistance policy to the Cuban regime?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I’m going to answer in Spanish if that’s okay guys, and then I’ll do it in English as well.  And does somebody do closed captioning on this?  (Laughter.)  Can they do it?  Can they – it doesn’t matter, because I’m going to say the same thing in English. 

(Via Translation.)

Look. The most significant threat in the region are these criminal terrorist groups. This is the threat faced by Colombia, the threat facing the entire hemisphere. It is the root cause of violence in Ecuador, in Mexico, in all of Central America, in all of these countries. It is the region’s most paramount threat. So we have governments cooperating with our efforts to counter that. Panama, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador. I do not want to leave anyone out, but there are many parties that cooperate.

We have and continue to have very good relationships with Colombia’s security teams.

I understand that the President, the President of Colombia, is an unusual person, but irrespective of that we have at the institutional level… we have very good relationships, and with Mexico… the government of Mexico is doing more at this moment on the issue of security than ever in its history. Much remains to be done, but we are cooperating. On the issue of Venezuela, we do not have that. This is an illegitimate regime that not only does not cooperate with the United States, but that also openly cooperates with criminal elements.

For example, the ELN and the FARC operate openly from the Venezuelan territory, drug trafficking entities operate openly and with the cooperation of the Maduro regime to send drugs such as cocaine to the United States through the Caribbean. This creates a very serious security situation in many countries, including Trinidad, the Dominican Republic, etc.

So, the United States is simply promoting security in the hemisphere, which includes, for example, Haiti as well, and we have been focused on that. Obviously, efforts against drug traffickers’ boats leaving Venezuela have received a lot of attention. What is underreported is what we are doing also in the Pacific, where there are ongoing efforts as well. The difference is that here we have the cooperation of friendly governments. What is not being talked about is what we are doing together with the Mexicans; what is not being talked about is what we are doing to create an anti-gang stability force inside Haiti. What is not being talked about is all the cooperation that exists with all of these governments to wage this war against these criminal terrorist elements that operate openly within our region and that threaten the States of this region.

The good news is that this new year will bring us more governments in the hemisphere that are willing to cooperate, in countries like Bolivia, in Chile. We already have very strong friendships in places like Paraguay and Argentina, and also the re-election of the Ecuadoran president, and the cooperation that exists in many countries, and we aim to expand those relationships with other countries as well.

So the effort is about that, and that is what we are focused on, and obviously, we have to identify what the sources of insecurity are in the region. And that source is the reason why Venezuela has received so much attention. It is because Venezuela is a country that is not just an illegitimate regime that does not cooperate with us but also a regime that openly cooperates with criminal and terrorist elements, including Hezbollah, Iran and others. And clearly these narco groups cooperate openly from there.  

(In English)

The question that I – and it’s a question many of you might have as well – is when it comes to the Western Hemisphere, the single most serious threat to the United States from the Western Hemisphere is from transnational terrorist criminal groups, primarily focused on narcotrafficking, but they’re in all side businesses as well. 

So, the good news is we have a lot of countries in the region that openly cooperate and work with us to confront these challenges.  Mexico – their level of cooperation with us is the highest it’s ever been in their history.  Throughout Central America, for the most part, except for maybe Nicaragua and to some extent Honduras, we’ve had great cooperation from Ecuador, from El Salvador, from – well, Ecuador being in South America, but across the Pacific coast, where we’re also undertaking efforts.  Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama – these are all nations that cooperate with us openly in search of stability in the region. 

You move to the Caribbean Basin in Trinidad, in Guyana, in Jamaica, in the Dominican Republic, countries that openly cooperate with us – even Colombia, despite its unusual president, has institutions in that country that work very closely with us, and those ties remain unimpeded and unaffected.  So, all of this is very positive. 

There’s one place that doesn’t cooperate, and it’s the illegitimate regime in Venezuela.  Not only do they not cooperate with us, they openly cooperate with terrorist and criminal elements.  For example, they invite Hizballah and Iran to operate from their territory.  But they also allow the ELN and the FARC dissidents not just to operate from inside of Venezuelan territory, to control Venezuelan territory unencumbered, unimpeded.  On top of that, we know that they are in cahoots with drug trafficking organizations.  It’s not that they don’t – it’s not just that they don’t work with us against these organizations, okay?  It’s that they openly cooperate with these guys and allow them to operate.  So, these guys are marching in and out, doing whatever they want from Venezuelan territory, and it’s a challenge. 

And so that’s why that’s received so much attention.  But I would urge you to not just focus on that but also focus on all the other things we’re doing in the region, including, for example, standing up this gang suppression force in Haiti, which we – we were looking for 5,500 forces.  We already have pledges of up to 7,500 forces from a variety of countries.  We’ve seen donors step up to fund that effort.  That’s a very important effort.  It all ties together cohesively. 

But the goal here is to bring security and stability to the hemisphere, to the region, the region we live in, okay, which has not received enough attention.  To bring the elements of American power to achieve that, to do it in partnership with as many countries as are willing to work with us in that regard – that’s the goal here, and it’s comprehensive and involves more than just one place.  What makes Venezuela stand out is that the regime there actually cooperates with the terrorists. 

Yes, sir.  In that row right there, yeah, right there in —

QUESTION:  On the hemisphere, you recently – the White House recently put out the National Security Strategy, essentially reorienting towards the Western Hemisphere. 

SECRETARY RUBIO:  It was good, right?  I wrote that myself. 

QUESTION:  How is the strategy – yeah – (laughter) —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I was involved in writing it.  Yeah, yeah.   

QUESTION:  So, you can answer from both hats, I guess. 

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, exactly. 

QUESTION:  But how is that strategy going to dictate your relationship with other hemispheric powers like Canada and Mexico?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, I mean, we want to partner with as many people – I mean, they face the same threats that we do.  I mean, it’s Mexican mayors that are being assassinated in public squares.  It’s Mexican journalists that are being assassinated.  It’s parts of Mexico and institutions in Mexico that in some cases are compromised, usually through threat by these elements.  They recognize it, which is why they’re partnering with us.  Of course, we want to work with other governments in the region to confront this challenge, and in most cases, we have cooperative places.  Now, we don’t have that from Nicaragua or Cuba, but – obviously didn’t have it historically from Bolivia.  We hope and expect that that will change.  And we certainly don’t have that from the regime in Venezuela, who actually don’t just not cooperate with us, they openly cooperate with narcotrafficking elements that use Venezuela as a transshipment point. 

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  Today you had the second round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.  Do you foresee a potential deal between these two countries without another round of war? 

And the second question, if I may, on Sudan.  We know, Mr. Secretary, it’s a civil war, but also there’s a regional factor here.  Where the U.S. —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  A regional what, I’m sorry? 

QUESTION:  Factor in this war. 

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Okay, yeah. 

QUESTION:  Where the U.S. stands here, and what’s a red line for you?  Is a divided Sudan is a red line for the U.S.?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, let’s separate the two, because they’re both easy questions, right?  So, the first one is we’re hopeful.  Look, at the end of the day, the goal everybody shares is a strong Lebanese Government that controls the country and Hizballah is disarmed.  They’re no longer an armed element that can threaten Israel’s security – that’s the goal here.  And we have tried, in a cooperative way, to do everything we can to empower the Lebanese Government to have the ability to do that.  And so, I hope that’s what these talks are aimed towards, and we’ll be supportive in every way we can to achieve that outcome. 

What I think is abundantly clear to everybody is no one is in favor of a Hizballah that can once again threaten the region, act as a direct Iranian proxy.  And obviously if they threaten Israel, we’re not going to have peace.  So, we are hopeful that the talks between Lebanese authorities and the Israelis will create outlines and a way forward that prevents further conflict.  I think – I don’t speak for the Israeli Government.  I can only tell you and echo what they’ve said publicly, and that is that if they feel threatened by Hizballah, they will take actions in their defense against them. 

So, we all would hope that we could avoid that, right?  We would all hope – in order to have peace, you have to avoid that.  And the best way to avoid it is to have a strong Lebanese Government that can actually control the country and that Hizballah is no longer an armed threat to Israel or to the Lebanese state.  And that’s what we’re committed to hoping to achieve and we hope – I can’t speculate on what the talks will lead to, but we’ll do we can to make them productive. 

On Sudan, you’ve rightfully outlined, I mean, there are regional elements to this.  I mean, there are – clearly both sides, the SAF and the RSF, have supporters from outside of Sudan’s borders that are involved, and we’ve been engaging with those countries.  There – it’s not just countries that are providing them weaponry and equipment; it’s also countries that are providing transshipment, particularly to the RSF, to receive weapons – in some cases advanced weaponry. 

Our goal right now in the short term – what we’ve emphasized to everybody, including in my calls with leaders in the UAE, leaders in Saudi Arabia; we’re very engaged on that.  Our special envoy, Massad Boulos, just returned from the region, meeting with the Egyptians, with the Saudis, with the UAE, and others.  We’ve also been in collaboration with the UK on some of this.  Our goal, the immediate goal we have, is a cessation of hostilities, okay, a humanitarian truce going into the new year that allows humanitarian organizations to be able to deliver aid to the people in great distress. 

Right now, that’s not possible.  We are hearing – continue to see reports of humanitarian convoys actually being struck on their way in, and so you can just imagine – what’s amazing to us is these convoys are struck and the rest of the convoy continues.  That’s how committed these groups are.  But what we said to everybody on it is that what’s happening there is horrifying, it’s atrocious; that one day the story of what’s actually happened there is going to be known and everyone involved is going to look bad.  And we have played – the role we have played is a convening role in bringing the parties to the table.  So, I think we will know more very soon about whether this is possible.

One of the challenges and frustrations in Sudan has been that one side or the other will commit to certain things, and then they won’t live up to those commitments.  They’ll agree to anything and implement nothing; and oftentimes what happens is when one side feels like they’re making advances in the battlefield, they don’t necessarily see the need to concede at that point because they believe they’re on the verge of achieving some success on the ground, and a truce would set them back. 

But what we’ve emphasized is none of these groups can operate without the support they’re receiving externally, so we have been engaging with the countries involved from the outside to ensure that they are at the table and that they are pushing for the same outcome that we want, which is, phase one, a humanitarian truce that at a minimum allows us to deal with the humanitarian calamity that occurs there.  And obviously, we hope that while that truce is ongoing, we can focus on the other elements that led to this conflict and help to resolve some of those. 

But our number one priority we’re focused on, 99 percent of our focus, is this humanitarian truce and achieving that as soon as possible, and we think that the new year and the upcoming holidays are a great opportunity for both sides to agree to that.  And we’re really pushing very hard on that regard.

Yes, sir.  Right there, because I missed you.

QUESTION:  (Via translation)

Mr. Rubio, in Spanish, if I may. President Trump has called President Gustavo Petro a drug leader and has used, terms…

SECRETARY RUBIO:  (Via translation) 

He has also said things about us.

QUESTION:  (Via translation)

Sure, totally. Of course. Okay, Secretary Rubio, is there any proof or why does this Administration call Gustavo Petro a drug trafficking leader?  And finally Secretary, I would like to as, given the invitation that Gustavo Petro has made now to President Trump, if you are considering going to Colombia and talking with Gustavo Petro. Thank you.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  (Via translation) We talk to everyone. Unfortunately, this is a person who is not very consistent in his statements, but we will not allow the actions of a President whose term will end soon to damage the relationship that exists between the United States and Colombia. This is a very close relationship. A relationship that has been built over the past 50 years. An important commercial, diplomatic, military and security relationship. It’s one of the greatest partners and allies we have in the region and what we want… We are not going to allow any kind of problem that exists with a specific individual to hurt this very important relationship. Hopefully in future there will be the opportunity to enhance cooperation at the highest levels of the Colombian government, but we will not harm or do not want to harm all the relationships that we have and the ties we have, including people in the legislative body and also elected officials locally and many different mayors and different places within Colombia, who also have very good relationship with the United States, and the extensive and close relationship that exists between our peoples as well.

(In English)

The question is, again, about Colombia.  I said, look, we’re not going to let sort of the pronouncements of an unstable individual over there to impact – we don’t want to let it impact our broader relationship with Colombia.  It’s an important relationship, an important alliance.  It extends through commercial, people to people, cultural, obviously security and stability – all of these things – and our job is to try to, to the extent possible, maintain those strong ties between Colombia and the United States and not allow them to be imperiled by the pronouncements of one person.

We would hope to see a day soon in which we have better relations with the leader of that country.  But we’re not going to let the fact that that doesn’t exist now – we’re going to do everything possible to not let that impact the relationships we have with the people of Colombia, with the nation, with their economy, with their security forces, which are very important.  This is a very important alliance, a very important strategic partnership which we’ve built up through a lot of hard work over decades, and we’re not going to let that fall apart because of one person.

If that changes and he changes, that would be great, and obviously in May there’ll be a new president there and be elections, and we’ll work, hopefully, more cooperatively with whoever replaces the current president.  But that’s up to the people of Colombia.

Did I not get your question?  Go ahead.

QUESTION:  Thank you.  Returning to Gaza, what is the U.S. understanding of what Hamas is willing to concede on disarmament?  Reports suggest that Hamas might hand over its heavy weapons but retain its smaller arms.  Is the U.S. prepared to accept partial disarmament as sufficient in phase two?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, I’m not going to get into the details of those types of negotiations.  Let me just couch it to you this way:  Everyone wants peace.  No one wants a return to a war.  If Hamas is every in a position in the future that they can threaten or attack Israel, you’re not going to have peace, okay?  You’re not going to convince anyone to invest money in Gaza if they believe another war is going to happen in two to three years.  So, I would just ask everyone to focus on what are the kind of weaponries and capabilities that Hamas would need in order to threaten or attack Israel as a baseline for what disarmament needs to look like.  Because you’re not going to have peace.  If two years from now Hamas is launching rockets or killing Israelis or carrying out, God forbid, another 7th of October type terrorist attack and so forth, you’re not going to have peace.  So, who is going to invest in a peace, who is going to invest in rebuilding a place, that’s going to get destroyed again in a future war?  So that’s why disarmament is so critical. 

Now, what that entails, we’re going to leave that to the technical teams to work on.  It would have to be something obviously that they’re willing to agree to that our partners can push them and pressure them to agree to.  It also has to be something that Israel agrees to.  In order for that to work, both sides have to agree on it, and we need the space to do it.  But that’s the way to think about it, okay?  You cannot have a Hamas that can threaten Israel in the future.  If they can, you won’t have peace.  So that’s the goal. 

All right.  Who’s left in that row?  Right there with the mustache, or the —

QUESTION:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  Does the U.S. have the goal of removing Maduro from power?  Do you expect any regime change this 2026?  I would appreciate if you could answer both in English and in Spanish.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  In Spanish?  It sounds so much better in Spanish when I answer that question. 

QUESTION:  Yeah.  No, but for my —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  So, I’ll start in English.  Look, our goal is regional stability and security in the national interest of the United States.  The national interest of the United States specifically when it comes to Venezuela is as follows. 

We have a regime that’s illegitimate; that cooperates with Iran, that cooperates with Hizballah; that cooperates with narcotrafficking and narcoterrorist organizations, inclusive not just protecting their shipments and allowing them to operate with impunity, but also allows some of them to control territory, the Se and the FARC-D.  Okay?  The ELN and the FARC dissidents operate openly.  They have like open camps that they control territory inside of Venezuela.  That is our – that is our national interest and that is what this is focused on, and that is what the President’s been focused on, and that’s what we’re conducting.  And that’s what we have been focused on the entire time because that is the threat to the national interest of the United States.

Now, do we consider Maduro legitimate?  No.  And by the way guys, when I say these things about Maduro and his role in narcotrafficking, it’s not – I hear your reports, Marco Rubio says it.  I don’t – it’s not me.  A grand jury in New York, in the Southern District of New York – okay, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York was presented evidence and came back with an indictment – not just against Maduro, by the way, but against a bunch of people in his government – for narcotrafficking.  A bunch.  He had his nephews or the nephews of the – of his wife indicted, convicted in the United States for narcotrafficking. 

Like this was – until President Trump started doing something about these narcotrafficking links, nobody disputed that Maduro and his regime was in cahoots with narcotraffickers, not to mention the fact that they unleashed Tren de Aragua gangs on the United States.  They’ve unleashed a mass migration event – perhaps the largest in history.  Eight million people have left Venezuela since 2014, so also destabilizing all the countries in the region who had to assume people that are fleeing this illegitimate regime.  So – but nobody disputed the drug links.  So, our – that’s what the President has been focused on and that’s the problem.  And that’s the problem in Venezuela. 

(Via translation)

In the case of Venezuela, it is very simple. It is an illegitimate regime that openly cooperates with Iran, with Hezbollah, and with drug trafficking groups. Even the ELN and the FARC operate openly within Venezuelan territory (Inaudible.). Therefore, the threat facing the United States is this: we have an illegitimate regime that openly cooperates with terrorist elements, and that is why we consider the Maduro regime a terrorist regime. It openly cooperates with regimes and terrorist organizations that threaten the security of the United States. That is our interest, and that is what we are focused on.

(In English)

Okay, next row right there.  You.  Yeah.

QUESTION:  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  With all due respect for my colleagues, I’m going to ask this one in Spanish. 

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Okay.

QUESTION:  (Via translation)

Mr. Secretary, you just said that you do not expect or that it is not the intention of the United States that the differences with President Gustavo Petro affect the relationship with Colombia, but the truth is that they have had implications. Colombia was de-certified. President Donald Trump ordered the suspension of cooperation resources for our country and the security consequences of this are already being seen in Colombia. As recently as last night, six Colombian soldiers were killed by the ELN during a terrorist attack, and the key question in Colombia today is what will happen next year if Colombia elects a left-wing president. If the relationships of the United States, the good relationships with Colombia and the support of the United States will depend on the Colombian people choosing a president that is seen favorably by this Administration.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  (Via translation)

This is not about left or right, this is about a person who simply does not cooperate with us on these efforts. That is what it is all about. At the end of the day, the Colombian people will choose their next president. It is a democracy, they hold elections. Hopefully all requirements will be met. They have a long history of meeting democratic requirements. We are not saying that Petro has not been democratically elected, nobody here says that. But basically, this is not about the left or right, it is about having in power a president who cooperates with us. Surely the stance he takes against the United States has affected our relationship. There is no doubt about that. None. We are trying to limit that as much as possible, but we also have interests that we have to protect and we cannot pretend otherwise when a president is telling security elements not to cooperate with the United States. We can’t ignore that. But on the other hand, we understand that we have within the Colombian system, even at the legislative level, in Congress, in the Senate, also mayors and other political leaders of that country who are indeed interested in good relationships with the United States, and even leaders who are not right-wing, who are leftist leaders, but who understand the importance of that relationship. But this is neither about left nor right. It is about whether or not there will be cooperation with the United States. We have a long history of cooperating with Colombia, which was an example and a model for the region, and what we have now is not as good, and that is unfortunate. Hopefully that changes.

(In English)

The question was about the – whether the U.S. relations to Colombia is dependent on whether they elect a leader that’s center-right or center-left.  It has nothing to do with left or right.  It has to do very simply with whether or not we have a leader there that we can work with.  The U.S.-Colombian relationship – especially our security relationship, but also our economic one with a free trade agreement, is a model.  It was a model for the region.  We tried to replicate that.  Everybody would use Plan Colombia as an example of what you need to do in these other places, and we want to continue that. 

Now, no doubt when you have the president of a country saying some of the things and ordering some of the things that he’s ordered, it’s going to have an impact on some of that relationship.  Our job is to try to preserve and protect as much of that relationship as possible, but it will be impacted.  But it doesn’t matter whether the next president is center-right or center-left.  That’s not the issue.  The issue is whether the next president is someone who is going to once again cooperate with the United States and restart these relations.  That’s what we seek.  And if President Petro changes in his stance, perhaps that could change as well.  But if he doesn’t, obviously it’ll be up to the people of Colombia to elect their next president.

Yes, ma’am.  Right there in the middle.

QUESTION:  Secretary Rubio —  

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I don’t want you guys to think I’m only picking the Spanish ones, okay?  (Laughter.)  I actually don’t know who any – well, there’s a list here, but I can’t even read it without these glasses. 

All right, go ahead.  I’m sorry.  Perdóneme.

QUESTION:  (Via translation)

Secretary Rubio, you have been denouncing the regime of Nicolás Maduro for years and recently you were involved in a telephone conversation between President Trump and Nicolás Maduro. I would like to ask what your impression of Nicolás Maduro was during that conversation, considering that you have known him for years. Based on his behavior, if he feels besieged, as reported by the media. If he is open to going to another country in exchange for a pardon. If you are considering meeting with him. How did that conversation go? What can you tell us about the impact it is having on the press?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  (Via translation)

I am not going to comment on any conversation between President Trump and any other person in the world, and whether or not it took place. I am not going to get into that. I will repeat what I have already said. This is something very simple, and it is about the national interests of the United States. There is a regional threat, and in the case of Venezuela we have no cooperation. To begin with, it is an illegitimate regime. Second, it is a regime that does not cooperate, it is anti-American in all its statements and actions. And third, it is a regime that not only does not cooperate with us, but also openly cooperates with dangerous, terrorist and criminal elements. Even they themselves are. So it is hard to reach a deal with terrorists who are openly cooperating with these dangerous elements that threaten America’s security. Other than that, I will not speculate.

QUESTION:  (Via translation)

But will there be war, Mr. Secretary? Because right now in Colombia… Every day people in Venezuela believe there is an actual possibility of a war between the United States and Colombia.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  (Via translation)

We are protecting the national interest of the United States. I think that is our right. And I will also tell you that in Colombia there must be a lot of concern that there has been an attack the day before yesterday or yesterday by the ELN or the FARC, I think it was the ELN. And they operate openly from Venezuelan territory, as if they were a sovereign country operating openly within Venezuelan territory.

(In English) 

It’s the same question, guys, and that is the bottom line is very simple.  Our interest in Venezuela and in the region is the national interest of the United States, and in Venezuela we have an illegitimate regime that not only does not cooperate with the United States but ultimately cooperates with narcoterrorists and others who threaten the national security of our country. 

The gentleman in the middle.  I’m going to try to get to everybody, I promise.  But you guys, by then your questions will be more specific. 

QUESTION:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  You said a few moments ago that everyone wants peace for Gaza, and yet by any metric the Israelis are flouting the ceasefire that President Trump negotiated by killing an average of two children a day, not allowing the agreed-upon humanitarian aid into Gaza.  How long can this continue?  How long can the Israelis be allowed to show such disrespect to President Trump? 

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, look, that’s your characterization of it about the term “disrespect.”  What I would say is this.  This – we – this was – first of all, it was a miracle that it happened in the first place.  We all understand how difficult it was for that to come to the conclusion that it did, where the actual – the bombing and everything else, the scale and scope of what we saw ended, all the hostages were released, and we have relative peace right now for the most part, despite the things you’re pointing to.  That was very difficult. 

But this is not easy.  Peace is a verb.  It’s not – it’s an action.  It’s not a sentiment.  Every single day will bring challenges.  Every single day.  We also have had instances, for example, over the last couple weeks where Hamas elements emerged from a tunnel, attached an explosive device to the side of a vehicle, and injured and almost killed Israeli soldiers.  We still have this threat.  We still have and see every single day Hamas openly taking steps to strengthen themselves with – inside of those places in Gaza that they still control.  We saw early on the atrocities they were committing in the streets against people as they were trying to show people how strong they were.

So, I don’t think I’m standing here to tell you this is going to be easy.  This is an hour-by-hour, day-by-day challenge.  It’s one of the reasons why we have stood up this center there in – operating in Israel in partnership as well with another cell that exists in a regional country.  It’s why every single day there are leading – there are meetings among both intelligence, diplomatic, and military officials of multiple countries that helped bring about this deal to manage this.  And that’s why it is so critical, it is so critical and so key, that we move to complete this first phase, that we move to put in place the Board of Peace, get everybody to agree to be a part of it, move to put in place this Palestinian technocratic organization so that they can begin to provide some governance structure, and move to put in place the stabilization force. 

That’s the goal here.  But it’s not going to be easy.  Every day will bring new challenges to that, and we recognize those challenges are coming from all sides.

QUESTION:  Very quick follow-up.  Who’s going to be – want to be a part of a stabilization force if Israel is effectively using Gaza as a free fire zone?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, these are the things we – that’s – these are the things that we’re working through right now.  Again, that’s why it didn’t happen yesterday.  That’s why we didn’t – I don’t mean yesterday literally.  That means why we’re not there yet.  This is the hard work of diplomacy and peacemaking.  Peacemaking isn’t just signing a piece of paper.  It’s actually complying with it.  And compliance oftentimes requires – in many cases, in most cases requires – daily, constant follow-up and nurturing. 

So that is why we are in such a hurry – and I say as a priority – to get to this point where we have the stabilization force in place overseen by the Board of Peace and ultimately a Palestinian technocratic entity that can increase in its capability to provide governance.  The stronger they are, the weaker Hamas will be in terms of threatening Israel, and I think the more security Israel should feel and less need for some of these things to happen. 

But no one is claiming this is going to be easy.  We have to work on this every single day.  We have people in this building and deployed abroad – this is all they do 24 hours a day, day after day, elements of the State Department, the Department of War, and all other agencies, and including Jared and Steve and even myself who talk or do something about – there isn’t a day in the last since we – this was signed two months ago – that haven’t had to do something with regards to making progress on the phases of the ceasefire.

Yes, ma’am.  Right next. 

QUESTION:  Thank you.

QUESTION:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I’m sorry.  I’m going to get to you.  I’m calling – see, I’m going down the rows like this. 

QUESTION:  Thank you.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  So right behind you, because I’m still in that row. 

QUESTION:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for having the briefing.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Has anyone ever done this, where they go like