As fighting between the United States, Israel and Iran grinds into its second month, a diplomatic track is coming into sharper focus — one that was being assembled well before the first missiles were fired.
Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt have emerged as the most visibly active intermediaries, forming an unusual grouping outside the Gulf states that have traditionally anchored Iran diplomacy. Their growing prominence reflects pre-war manoeuvring and a shared advantage: working channels to Tehran alongside closer ties to U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration.
That dynamic was on display last week when Pakistan hosted foreign ministers from Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in Islamabad to discuss regional de-escalation and proposals to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Ideas floated to Washington included a Suez Canal-style fee structure or a consortium to manage shipping flows — confidence-building steps that could feed into efforts to secure a broader ceasefire. Two days later, Pakistan’s foreign minister travelled to Beijing to seek Chinese backing.
Turkey had been pushing for a multilateral diplomatic format even before the war, seeking to host talks aimed at reviving an Iran deal. Those efforts were derailed when Tehran opted at the last minute to shift discussions back to Oman.
Egypt’s role has been quieter but steady. Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has built up regular diplomatic contact with Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araqchi in the years leading up to the war, reflecting Cairo’s increased engagement on the Iran file. Egypt and Iran have had rocky relations for decades, moving only early this year to restore diplomatic ties after decades of fitful engagement.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has moved decisively into the spotlight. Senior officials have stepped up contacts with Trump administration figures, with army chief Asim Munir in regular touch – Trump has called him his “favourite field marshall.” Islamabad has offered to host U.S.–Iran talks, leveraging its border with Iran, its large Shi’ite population and defence ties with both Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to position itself as a key channel.
All three countries are also under mounting economic strain from the war, which has disrupted trade, tourism and energy supplies. In Egypt, authorities ordered shops and cafés — hallmarks of famously nocturnal Cairo — to close by 9 p.m. to conserve electricity.
Taken together, these shifts suggest a mediation landscape being reshaped by the war, with non-Gulf actors stepping forward as traditional channels strain. Oman, which hosted U.S.–Iran talks until shortly before the conflict, has slipped behind after U.S. officials publicly criticised Muscat’s foreign minister. Qatar, long a backchannel to Tehran, has said it cannot play that role while under attack, even as its emir has embarked on diplomacy with Gulf Arab neighbours.
The result is a diplomatic map that looks markedly different from past Iran crises — and one that may shape any eventual off-ramp from the conflict.
