Why a Democratic Senate, Once Unthinkable, Is a Real Possibility
At the start of the 2026 election cycle, the Senate looked far out of reach for the Democrats. The House always seemed competitive, but retaking the Senate would require flipping at least four Republican-held seats — including at least two seats in states that President Trump won by double digits in 2024. In today’s polarized era, Democrats would need everything to break their way. So far, everything is breaking the Democrats’ way. With Mr. Trump’s approval rating falling and inflation rising, along with the uncertainty of a war in the Middle East, it’s not hard to imagine a Democratic tsunami in November. A blue wave is not guaranteed, of course, and Democrats would not be assured to flip two reliably Republican states even if it were. But a feasible path for the party to win the Senate is coming into focus.
In recent polls, Democrats appear tied or ahead in four Republican-controlled seats — the number they would need to take the Senate. These include Maine and North Carolina, where the likely Democratic nominees hold clear leads, as well as Ohio and Alaska, where Democrats have recruited strong candidates in states Mr. Trump won by double digits in 2024. There are also signs that Republicans could be in danger in two more states where Mr. Trump won by double digits: Iowa and Texas. Over the last few weeks, the betting markets have shifted to make the Senate a tossup, though some analysts haven’t gone quite so far. Whether the Senate is a tossup or not, it’s clearly competitive — and that’s something that might have been hard to imagine a year ago. In the Trump era, Democratic Senate candidates haven’t had much success at winning in red states. They failed to flip vigorously contested seats in Texas, Tennessee and Montana in 2018 and 2020. And most Democratic red-state incumbents — including those in Florida, Indiana, North Dakota and Missouri — lost re-election. Today, every Democrat in the Senate represents a state that voted for Joe Biden in 2020. Looking even further back, no party has managed to flip two states that leaned so much toward the other party since 2008. Only one such seat (Illinois in 2010) was flipped in a regularly scheduled election; two more flipped in memorable special elections (Massachusetts 2010 and Alabama 2017). Most of these victories took extraordinary circumstances, like a criminal conviction, a child molestation allegation or a bank seizure. This time, Democrats aren’t benefiting from anything as unusual as a criminal conviction. Instead, they’re counting on a favorable national political environment, strong candidates and the possibility that several of these states may not be quite as Republican-leaning as they seem. Strong tailwindsLet’s start with the national environment. There’s no doubt that the political winds are at the party’s back — and might get stronger. The easiest measure is Mr. Trump’s approval rating, which has fallen to 40 percent with 56 percent disapproving, according to our average. That’s lower than his rating during the 2018 campaign, when Democrats won the combined national House popular vote by seven percentage points. It’s also lower than Bill Clinton’s approval rating in 1994 or Barack Obama’s approval rating during 2010 and 2014, when Republicans won sweeping midterm victories. It’s pretty similar to George W. Bush’s approval rating in November 2006, when Democrats dominated.
Even if Mr. Trump successfully negotiates a quick end to the war in Iran, it will be hard for his standing to improve much by November. His ratings have been in steady decline for about a year, and the war has only added to the weight of persistent inflation. If the conflict isn’t resolved quickly, the risks are enormous: Historically, quagmire abroad and rising prices at home are the ingredients of a failed presidency. There’s one reason to question whether the national political environment is as good for Democrats as it seems: They lead by only five or six points on the so-called generic congressional ballot, which asks voters which party they’ll support for Congress. This is a sizable lead, but it’s smaller than the Democrats’ edge at this point during the 2006 or 2018 cycle. These polls, however, generally reflect the opinions of all adults or registered voters, not the smaller group of voters who turn out in midterms. Democrats clearly have an enormous advantage among these highly engaged voters: In recent special elections, Democrats have significantly outperformed Kamala Harris’s 2024 showings. For good measure, there’s a longstanding tendency for the generic ballot polling to drift toward the party out of power. To the extent Democrats are held back by the party’s national brand on a “generic” question, strong candidates with their own distinct brands might be better positioned to capitalize.
Strong recruitmentIf there’s a single reason Democrats have a realistic chance to win the Senate, it’s that they’ve recruited unusually strong candidates in three states that supported Mr. Trump three times: North Carolina, Ohio and Alaska. In all three states, the Democrats’ likely nominees are popular recent statewide office holders. They either won their last campaign or were highly competitive in losing re-election under less favorable political conditions. So far, the polls show those Democrats running well ahead of what one might otherwise expect. In light-red-to-purple North Carolina, the former governor Roy Cooper’s decision to run for the Senate might turn the contest into a snoozer. He won comfortable re-election as governor in 2020, even as Mr. Trump carried the state. And he’s running against a candidate — Michael Whatley, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee — who has never held office. The polls taken since the primary show Mr. Cooper ahead by three to 14 points. Perhaps more significant are the candidacies of the former senator Sherrod Brown in Ohio and the former House member Mary Peltola in Alaska. Their entries into the race are certainly more unusual. The minority party doesn’t usually have many strong candidates in states that lean heavily toward the other party. It would be fortunate for Democrats to have even one established candidate in a red state, let alone one for both Alaska and Ohio. Ms. Peltola and Mr. Brown lost re-election in 2024, but their strong showings make it easy to imagine how they could prevail in this year’s more favorable political environment. In Ohio, Mr. Brown lost by 3.6 points in 2024; Ms. Peltola lost by around two points in Alaska. Today, the Democrats are faring about eight points better on the generic congressional ballot than they did in the 2024 combined U.S. congressional popular vote. Or put another way: Mr. Brown and Ms. Peltola probably would have won re-election in 2024 if those contests had been held in this political environment. There haven’t been many polls in either state, but every recent poll in Alaska shows Ms. Peltola ahead; every poll in Ohio shows a very close race.
Then there’s Maine. Democrats did recruit a candidate with demonstrated statewide appeal: Gov. Janet Mills. But she trails in the Democratic primary against Graham Platner, a first-time candidate and veteran running as a populist progressive. In recent polls, he leads Ms. Mills by a staggering two-to-one margin — or even more. In a blue state like Maine, Mr. Platner’s progressive bona fides are not necessarily a disadvantage, even against an electoral juggernaut like the Republican moderate Susan Collins. A lengthy trail of provocative online comments and a now-covered tattoo that resembled a Nazi symbol might be expected to be bigger liabilities. But, perhaps surprisingly, Mr. Platner still holds a clear lead in the polls against Ms. Collins in the general election. Texas and IowaEven with Alaska and Ohio in play and with North Carolina and perhaps Maine looking favorable, the Democrats’ path to control of the Senate is still daunting. To win, they would need to go four for four in those Republican-held seats while defending seats in Georgia, Michigan and New Hampshire. It’s hard to argue that Democrats are even-money favorites to take the Senate if they need to go seven for seven. Enter Iowa and Texas. On paper, it’s not obvious that either state ought to be competitive, even in this political environment. Mr. Trump won them by a slightly bigger margin than he did in Alaska and Ohio, and Democrats don’t have well-established candidates. By the numbers, these states seem like Florida, which isn’t as serious an option for Democrats. But for different reasons, Democrats can still picture a victory in Texas and Iowa. Texas has the clearer case. While Mr. Trump won the state by 14 points, the Lone Star may not be as red as it seems. In 2020, Texas voted for Mr. Trump by just 5.6 points; his double-digit victory in 2024 was built on enormous gains among nonwhite voters, who have snapped back to the Democrats in recent polls. That would send Texas zooming back toward the left — and, in this national environment, into contention. In the state primary in March, more voters cast ballots for Democrats than Republicans. The Republican position could weaken further if the incumbent, John Cornyn, loses the primary runoff to Ken Paxton, the state attorney general and a conservative firebrand. The polls don’t show Mr. Paxton performing that much worse than Mr. Cornyn against the Democratic nominee, James Talarico, but Mr. Paxton brings distinct liabilities — including a lengthy F.B.I. bribery investigation (no charges were brought). Iowa, on the other hand, is one of the whitest states in the country; a reversion among nonwhite voters there won’t do much to help Democrats. The Democrats don’t have a high-profile candidate, and the likely Republican nominee, Representative Ashley Hinson, is a solid candidate. But Iowa has a case of its own. While it didn’t swing disproportionately toward Mr. Trump in 2024, only North Dakota swung more toward Mr. Trump in 2016. It’s possible that Iowa’s relatively moderate, white working-class voters might still be open to swinging back in a Democratic-leaning national environment. In the 2018 midterm elections, Democrats actually won the House popular vote in Iowa — something they did not come close to achieving in any of the other red states we’ve mentioned. Democrats are expected to be highly competitive in the state’s race for governor; the presumptive nominee is the state auditor, Rob Sand, who won statewide in 2018 and 2022. And Mr. Trump’s tariffs have hit this agricultural state hard. Democrats don’t have many serious options beyond Texas and Iowa. Nebraska, where the independent Dan Osborn is running again, seems unlikely so long as a Democrat is on the ballot. But even without another long-shot state, competitive races in Iowa and Texas would give Democrats breathing room. If a blue wave materializes, Democrats have a chance to ride it to Senate control. Read past editions of the newsletter here. If you’re enjoying what you’re reading, please consider recommending it to others. They can sign up here. Have feedback? Send me a note at dear.upshot@nytimes.com.
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